Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning and Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding Abetting and Conspiracy Liability under RICO

In March 1993, accountants, attorneys and other professionals—who generally view RICO with suspicion—breathed a sigh of relief when they read the Washington Post: People who lose money in thrifts and other businesses that go belly up because of wrongdoing can no longer use [RICO] to sue lawyers, accountants, or other advisers who played key roles in the enterprise. Unfortunately, this terse description of the Supreme Court\u27s decision issued the previous day in Reves v. Ernst & Young may persuade professionals that they dropped an anchor in a tranquil safe-harbor, far from an exposure to the perils of the private enforcement provisions of RICO that authorize the recovery of treble damages and counsel fees for engaging in certain kinds of commercial frauds. The last chapter on the ultimate impact of the Supreme Court\u27s decision, however, is not yet written. In fact, a careful analysis of the Court\u27s opinion in the context of well-settled areas of criminal jurisprudence indicates that Reves\u27 impact should be far more nuanced; it should not result in creating a safe-harbor for errant professionals

Practice and Procedure under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

The purpose of this article is to explore the substantive provisions of amended Rule 11 and its historic antecedents, the procedure by which sanctions may be sought and/or imposed, the sanctions which the court may impose and the persons upon whom the sanctions can be imposed